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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000657

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [EUN](#) [SU](#) [CD](#) [LY](#) [ER](#) [EG](#)

SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: DARFUR PARTNERS DISCUSS OUTCOMES FOR
TRIPOLI TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 00640

KHARTOUM 00000657 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Meeting on April 25 and 26, the UK convened a meeting of the U.S., EU, EC, Norway, France, and the Netherlands to discuss a set of potential outcomes for the upcoming Tripoli talks. The goal of the Darfur Partners' discussions was to promote a coordinated approach among the Western envoys when they arrive in Libya on April 28. While acknowledging that the UN and African Union (AU) were the only parties capable of re-energizing the Darfur political process, the Darfur Partners agreed to push both bodies to develop a framework for political dialogue in the near future. The Partners' comments underscored the frustration of the international community--including many working-level officials of the UN and AU--that UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim had not yet provided a concrete plan to channel the plethora of international initiatives on the Darfur political process. The Partners also questioned Eliasson and Salim's commitment to the sustained engagement necessary to advance the process.

¶2. (SBU) At the conclusion of the April 26 meeting, the Darfur Partners agreed to transmit the following principles to capitals to facilitate a coordinated approach to the Tripoli talks:

(Begin Text)

Tripoli Meeting Outcomes

-- Demand the immediate and unconditional cease-fire by and among all parties in Darfur, including the immediate cessation of aerial bombardments by the Government of Sudan. The implementation of this should make use of the mechanism agreed by the Joint Commission, including making fully operational the second chamber of the Cease-Fire Commission. A Joint Commission meeting should be held within two weeks. This should be held in Khartoum, as should future meetings if required.

-- Time has come for the Special Envoys to set a date, time and place for the holding of negotiations on Darfur. These should be started within two months. In preparation for this, the Special Envoys should be requested to produce a road map for discussion with parties within two weeks. This will need to include the determination of how delegates to the negotiations will be selected to ensure there is

appropriate representation.

-- The Governments of Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and Sudan should give their public commitment to the AU/UN process. In addition, the mediation efforts of Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and other parties should be brought under the AU/UN umbrella. The negotiations should be Sudanese-focused and therefore ultimately should be held in Sudan. One option that could be considered is to hold these negotiations in Southern Sudan, taking stock of the positive decision by the Government of Sudan to empower the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to support the political process.

-- The new AU/UN Special Representative for Darfur should be deployed to Sudan immediately. Given the impending departure of the Special Envoys, the AU and UN should also jointly nominate a single, full-time and adequately-resourced Special Envoy for leading the negotiations and their preparation.

-- Welcome the plan for President Deby to visit Khartoum in May. There is a need for the full implementation of the Tripoli agreement, and no further incursions of each others' rebels across borders.

-- Any party or individual who does not co-operate with the political process will be excluded from the negotiations; any party or individual who obstructs the political process or violates the cease-fire will be subject to UN sanctions under SCR 1591.

(End Text)

13. (C) Several of the Darfur Partners, including the EU, the Netherlands, and France, expressed a desire to have a more concise set of points to use as a basis for the Tripoli discussion. Such points could include: a strong endorsement of the UN/AU lead on the political process; a call for a

KHARTOUM 00000657 002.2 OF 002

cease-fire observed by all parties in the Darfur conflict; a call for the UN and AU--in consultation with the international community--to develop a clear framework for the political process and a division of labor to utilize the strengths of member states and the SPLM; support for an increase in the capacity of the UN/AU operation in Sudan to monitor the shifting dynamics of the rebel factions; and a cessation of regional actors' sponsorship of armed movements in Darfur. Language in the "Tripoli Meeting Outcomes" reflects UK pressure to insert timelines that some Partners, notably the EU, considered unrealistic. (Note: Per reftel, the SPLM, as well as numerous UN and AU officials in Khartoum and Darfur, have predicted that it would take several months to lay the groundwork for peace negotiations. End note.)

14. (C) In a follow-up conversation with Poloff, French Political Counselor Francois Colas expressed his government's opposition to the threat of sanctions to pressure Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories to participate in the political process. He said that France thought it was essential for a structured UN/AU political process to negotiate with all of the faction leaders to achieve a sustainable peace agreement and implied that France would oppose sanctions in the UN Security Council.

15. (C) Comment: In the last eight months, the non-signatories have sent consistent messages to the international community that they are not ready for negotiations. A successful political process must be structured to account for this reality. In order to bring about final negotiations between the rebel movements and the Sudanese government, the UN and AU must first engage in sustained, coordinated discussions with both the rebel leaders and the government in Khartoum to lay the groundwork for bringing the parties to the table.

End comment.

HUME